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A COMPARISON OF JOINT VENTURES IN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND JAPAN
I. INTRODUCTION
There are various methods by which a firm can enter the market
of a foreign country. It can set up a subsidiary, open a branch office,
contract with a distributing agent or enter into a joint venture with a
company in the host nation.' Joint ventures have traditionally been an
extremely popular form of doing business abroad, in that they allow
market penetration and the sharing of costs and risks.'
This Note will examine and compare the joint venture laws of the
People's Republic of China ("PRC") and Japan, to determine which
nation is more amenable to the establishment of joint ventures within
its respective borders. As the Chinese and Japanese economies gain in-
creasing strength,3 it is imperative that the government and corpora-
tions of the United States become more cognizant of the way in which
these two Pacific Rim powers view the joint venture as a mode of doing
business.
II. JOINT VENTURES
A joint venture is a "legal entity in the nature of a partnership
engaged in the joint prosecution of a particular transaction for mutual
profit."4 Contrary to a partnership, however, a joint venture "does not
entail a continuing relationship between the parties."5 Joint ventures
have been likened to marriages; the union dissolves when the interests
of the parties are no longer in concert."
Joint ventures can be broken down further into equity (or statu-
tory) and contractual joint ventures.7 Equity joint ventures are those
1. Asahina, Establishing A Presence: A Comparative Analysis of Entry Vehicles-I,
EAST ASIAN EXECUTIVE REPORTS, June 1985, at 18-19.
2. McArthur, Joint Ventures in Japan, 20 U. BRrr. COLUM. L. REV. 471 (1986).
3. See generally Surrey, Fishburne & Chaudhri, Joint Ventures in China: The First
Water Stop, 21 TEX. INT'L L.J. 221 (1986) [hereinafter Surrey]; E. HAHN, DOING BUSINESS
IN JAPAN (1984).
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 753 (5th ed. 1979).
5. Id.
6. Ballon, Joint Ventures, in BUSINESS IN JAPAN 134, 135 (P. Norbury & G. Bownes
ed. 1974); King, Joint Ventures, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN THE
FAR EAST 100-01 (R. Allison ed. 1972).
7. Surrey, supra note 3, at 222-23.
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established under a code or set of laws s and will be the focus of this
Note. Contractual joint ventures are "contractual arrangement[s] be-
tween two or more parties whereby the parties undertake a business
(frequently a construction project) or limited term coventure . .. .,
Unlike an equity joint venture, the parties to a contractual joint ven-
ture do not set up a corporation but "prefer to govern their rights en-
tirely by contract."' Of the two types of joint ventures, equity joint
ventures are more commonly used in the PRC" and Japan. 2
III. JOINT VENTURES IN THE PRC
Traditionally, the Chinese approach to law was a strong opposition
to formalized legislative codes; the Chinese preferred "the natural law
concept rather than .. . legal positivism."' 3 The Chinese felt that if
members of society had proper respect for each other, laws would be
8. Id. at 223.
9. Id. Additionally, contractual joint ventures, as opposed to equity joint ventures, do
not involve the creation of limited liability companies. Goossen, Joint Ventures Under
the New Civil Code, EAST ASIAN EXECUTIVE REPORTS, Mar. 1986, at 9.
10. Surrey, supra note 3, at 223. The Seventh National People's Congress, on April
13, 1988, passed a 28 article document governing contractual (or cooperative) joint ven-
tures. The Law of Sino-Foreign Co-operative Ventures, April 13, 1988, translated in
CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS 1 6-100 (CCH Australia Ltd. trans. 1988). As will be
explained infra, Western investors have typically avoided this form of investment be-
cause of the ambiguity that surrounded the contractual joint venture's legal status. Bates
& Jianping, The New Cooperative Joint Venture Law, EAST ASIAN EXECUTIVE REPORTS,
May 1988, at 7. Contractual joint ventures are generally more flexible investments than
equity joint ventures, and the Chinese are hoping that this law will make contractual
joint ventures more attractive to the foreign investor. Id. Until the Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations and Trade ("MOFERT"), however, pursuant to the provisions of
Article 27, promulgates a set of implementing regulations that will hopefully clarify the
rather broad principles set forth, foreign investment in contractual joint ventures will
probably not reach desired levels. Id.
11. Surrey, supra note 3, at 223.
12. Shapiro, Legal Aspects of Doing Business With Japan 1985, 249 PRACTICING L.
INST. 49 (1985).
13. H. KIM, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTS OF CHINA AND THE WEST - A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 20 (1981). The natural law concept in China is manifested in the concepts of
Heaven (T'ien), the Way (Tao), and Human Nature (Hsing), to name a few. Id. at 25. As
such, law is rooted in the moral behavior of the people, a concept grounded in Con-
fucianism. The chief purpose of the law is to instruct the people in conducting them-
selves in a manner that will bring about a "harmonious social order in accord with the
natural order." Id. at 17. Traditional Chinese law was feudalistic rather than democratic,
in that: customary law was favored over statutory law; the law's purpose was to create a
harmonious society, not establish rights and duties; and the law "reflect[ed] [an] organic
rather than a mechanistic society." Id. at 17-18. In short, traditional Chinese law was
"more paternalistic than individualistic." Id. at 20.
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unnecessary."' From the Buddhist influence, the Chinese have come to
believe that in a dispute, compromise is better than confrontation (in
which one side must win and the other lose).16 However, these concepts
only related to the way in which the Chinese dealt with each
other-foreigners were a different matter entirely."
The PRC realized, however, that it needed foreign investment to
galvanize its economic development. 7 Thus, in 1979, China shed its
historical antipathy of dealing with foreigners,"8 and enacted legislation
authorizing the formation of equity joint ventures with foreign compa-
nies.' This marked the first time in the history of Communist China
that foreign corporations would be allowed to directly participate in
profits and management.2" The enactment of this law is even more
amazing when it is examined in light of the regime governing the coun-
try of promulgation. According to classic Marxist-Leninist thought, the
whole concept of a joint venture seems to be unilaterally opposed to
"state ownership of the means of production."'" Nevertheless, the
PRC's officials decided that allowing foreign joint ventures would
quicken China's economic development by "attracting foreign capital
14. Id. at 19.
15. Carl, Contemporary Law in the People's Republic of China, 32 Sw. L.J. 1255,
1256-57 (1979). In settling disputes this way, both sides retained their dignity and the
community was not further troubled by disruption. Id.
16. J. BRIERLY & R. DAVID, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD TODAY 478-80 (2d
ed. 1978).
17. Jaslow, Practical Consideration in Drafting a Joint Venture Agreement with
China, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 209 (1983). In 1986, Chinese economic planners stated that the
PRC would need "$5 to $7 billion in foreign investment over the next five years in order
to meet plans for rapid upgrading of domestic industry without borrowing large amounts
on world capital markets." Spaulding, Structuring a Joint Venture: The Foreign Ex-
change Factor, EAST ASIAN EXECUTIVE REPORTS, May 1986, at 13. To achieve these levels
of foreign investment, Chinese planners have resolved to upgrade their efforts to increase
the attractiveness of the PRC to overseas investors. Id.
18. Jaslow, supra note 17, at 211. An example of foreign activity that has failed to
endear foreigners to the Chinese was the British mass importation of opium into China
in the early 19th century. This activity led to the Opium War in 1839. After the war's
cessation, China was forced to submit to a number of unfair treaties drafted by the vari-
ous Western nations, which were perceived as a great humiliation by the Chinese for
many years. Id. at 211 n.12.
19. Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ven-
tures, July 8, 1979 [hereinafter PRC JV Law], translated in LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
COMM'N OF THE STANDING COMM. OF THE NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE'S RE-
PUBLIC OF CHINA, THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1979-1982, at 150 (1987)
[hereinafter PRC LAWS].
20. Jaslow, supra note 17, at 209.
21. Surrey, supra note 3, at 224.
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and expediting the transfer of foreign technology to China."2 The joint
venture was
designed to enable China to embark on certain projects now,
albeit at the cost of allowing foreign equity participation. Thus
China preferred sharing profits with outsiders to either delay-
ing the projects until it could finance their foreign exchange
currency costs from domestic or international sources or di-
verting foreign exchange from other economic activities.2 3
A. The Joint Venture Law
The Joint Venture Law is short, containing only fifteen articles.
Article 2 is a key provision; it provides that the "Chinese Government
shall protect ... the investment of foreign joint venturers, the profits
due them and their other lawful rights and interests in an equity joint
venture, pursuant to the agreement, contract and articles of association
approved by the Chinese Government." '24
The foreign investor must contribute at least 25% of the joint ven-
ture's "registered capital." 5 Additionally, the joint venture will be a
limited liability company, with each investor liable only to the propor-
tion of its investment of the registered capital.
26
The parties to the joint venture decide on the association's life
span, "according to its particular line of business and circumstances."2 7
The parties may extend the duration of the joint venture at its expira-
tion, subject to the government's approval.28
The Joint Venture Law was a dramatic change for the PRC; it
marked the end of an era of "economic and political isolation from the
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. art. 2. Thus, this article is a statement that the Chinese Government intends
to protect the foreign investor from expropriation, alleviating the fear that capital in-
fused into the PRC may be taken for no particular reason. Deng Xiapoing and his top
ministers have repeatedly tried to assure foreign investors that "Chinese socialism is a
sufficiently secure economic investment to permit substantial investment from the
West." Rogers, Deterrents to Joint Venturing in China: A Look at Shanghai Real Es-
tate Projects, EAST ASIAN EXECUTIVE REPORTS, July 1986, at 9, 16.
25. PRC JV Law, supra note 19, art. 4. This provision has been interpreted to allow a
foreign investor to own 100% of a joint venture and "still enjoy the benefits of the Law."
Surrey, supra note 3, at 225. This, however, is a virtually non-existent practice. Id.
26. PRC JV Law, supra note 19, art. 4.
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rest of the world . ,,.I Its terseness, however, gave little reassurance
to foreign investors, who felt far more comfortable with detailed in-
vestment codes.30 As a result, the level of foreign investment fell short
of PRC expectations."1
B. The Joint Venture Regulations
The paucity of foreign investment, combined with the PRC's rou-
tine practice of promulgating exhaustive regulations to implement
"general legal pronouncements,"32 encouraged the State Council to is-
sue the Joint Venture Regulations." These regulations answer many of
the questions that arose from the Joint Venture Law, in addition to
"compensat[ing], in some measure, for the fact that China does not, to
date, have a companies law which, in other countries, provides many of
the details governing the establishment and operation of various busi-
ness arrangements." '34 China's hope was that, in enacting these regula-
tions, the world would see their "determination to adhere to a policy of
opening to the outside world.""
The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade of the
People's Republic of China ("MOFERT") must examine and approve
of each joint venture.36 Joint ventures are to be established to "pro-
29. Surrey, supra note 3, at 226.
30. Id. Foreign investors received no comfort from the JV Law's brevity or scarcity of
detail "because of the numerous issues not dealt with in the law." Id.
31. Id.; see also Klingenberg & Pattison, Joint Ventures in the People's Republic of
China, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 807, 811 (1979). As of May 1988, however, more than 9700 joint
ventures have been approved by the PRC. Gargan, Making the Right Contacts in China,
N.Y. Times, May 30, 1988, at A33, col. 4.
32. Surrey, supra note 3, at 226.
33. Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of The People's Republic of
China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, translated in BEIJING
REv., Oct. 10, 1983, at 10 [hereinafter PRC JV Regs.]. The Joint Venture Regulations
consist of 118 articles in 16 chapters. The document is broken down as follows: (1) Gen-
eral Provisions; (2) Establishment and Registration; (3) Form of Organization and Regis-
tered Capital; (4) Ways of Contributing Investment; (5) Board of Directors and Manage-
ment Office; (6) Acquisition of Technology; (7) Right to the Use of Site and Its Fee; (8)
Planning, Purchasing and Selling; (9) Taxes; (10) Foreign Exchange Control; (11) Finan-
cial Affairs and Accounting; (12) Staff and Workers; (13) Trade Union; (14) Duration,
Dissolution and Liquidation; (15) Settlement of Disputes; and (16) Supplementary
Articles.
34. Surrey, supra note 3, at 226-27.
35. Dacheng, Another Important Document on Joint Ventures, BEIJING REV., Oct. 3,
1983, at 4.
36. PRC JV Regs., supra note 33, art. 8. MOFERT may, however, delegate approval
authority to provincial or regional bodies, if it so desires. Id. In order to secure
MOFERT's approval, the Chinese participant must submit the following: (1) an applica-
tion; (2) a feasibility study prepared by both parties; (3) a joint venture agreement, con-
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mote the development of China's economy and the raising of scientific
and technological levels for the benefit of socialist modernization.""7
Certain industries are deemed to be "preferred industries" for joint
ventures, such as energy development and the computer and electron-
ics industries."' 8
Three contractual documents are required to establish a joint ven-
ture. 9 The Joint Venture Agreement states the main points and prin-
ciples governing the joint venture's establishment. 0 The Joint Venture
Contract lays out the rights and obligations of the parties."' Finally,
the Articles of Association indicate the purpose, organizational princi-
ples, and method of management of the joint venture. 2 The formation,
validity, interpretation and execution of the Joint Venture Contract
are governed by Chinese law.4" This is one of the Joint Venture Regu-
lation's least popular articles with foreign investors, because China's
legal system is neither fully evolved nor is it devoid of substantial un-
certainty in its enforcement.44
1. Investment Contribution
The form of investment contribution to the joint venture may be
either in cash or "in kind."4 Typical examples of "in kind" capital
contributions include industrial property and technology, specifically
those types of articles or processes that the Chinese do not have and
tract and articles of association, signed by authorized representatives of the venture; (4)
a list of the candidates for chairman, vice chairman and directors appointed by the par-
ties; and (5) a document signifying the approval of the local authorities where the joint
venture will be situated. Id. art. 9. Approval or disapproval of the joint venture will be
decided within three months. Id. art. 10. The applicant must register with the local ad-
ministrative bureau for the province within one month of receipt of the certificate of
approval from MOFERT. Id. art. 11.
37. Id. art. 3.
38. Id. High technology industries are highly desirable for the PRC, because these
fields will allow the Chinese to modernize their economy and compete with First and
Second World nations in the business arena. Bates, supra note 10, at 7.




43. Id. art. 15.
44. Surrey, supra note 3, at 229 n.24. This weakness has been recognized by both
Chinese and Western business people. Much of this ambiguity stems from the fact that,
until relatively recently, lawyers were almost non-existent in China. This scarcity was a
result of the communist takeover. Today, there are approximately 20,000 lawyers in the
PRC, but, when compared with the nation's one billion-plus population, the number ap-
pears to be minute. Spaulding, supra note 17, at 17.
45. PRC JV Regs., supra note 33, art. 25.
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thus desire.4 For "in kind" capital contributions, determination of the
contribution's value may be arrived at by either an agreement amongst
the parties or by a third party determination agreed to by the parties.'"
All "in kind" contributions must be vital to the joint venture's success,
not readily available in China,"8 and approved by Chinese authorities.'9
Finally, after all contributions are in by both parties, a Chinese regis-
tered accountant will verify the value and issue a certificate of verifica-
tion." Upon receipt of the certificate of verification, the parties issue
an investment certificate,5' which serves as the only source of evidence
of their investment.
52
2. The Board of Directors/Managerial Positions
The Board of Directors is the venture's highest authority.8 The
Board must be composed of no less than three members, with the
chairman being appointed by the Chinese participant and the vice-
chairman by the foreign participant.5 4 The Board is required to meet
at least once a year.5 5 Unanimous agreement of the Board is required
for the following actions: (1) amendment of the Articles of Association;
(2) termination and dissolution of the joint venture; (3) an increase or
assignment of the registered capital of the joint venture; and (4)
merger of the joint venture with any other economic entity"
A management office is required, consisting of a general manager
and several deputy managers, for the daily running of the operation. 7
The managerial positions may be held by Chinese or non-Chinese citi-
zens."' In order for the joint venture to open branch offices outside of
China, MOFERT's approval is required.
5 9
46. Surrey, supra note 3, at 232.
47. PRC JV Regs., supra note 33, art. 25.
48. Id. art. 27.
49. Id. art. 30.
50. Id. art. 32.
51. Id.
52. Surrey, supra note 3, at 232. This is so because there is no provision in the Regu-
lations for the issuance of stock. Id.
53. PRC JV Regs., supra note 33, art. 33.
54. Id. art. 34. The remainder of the Board of Directors is chosen by both parties. Id.
55. Id. art. 35. Additionally, Article 35 requires a quorum of two-thirds of the direc-
tors but, unlike the American practice, directors are permitted to give proxies for meet-
ings, which may be used in the determination of a quorum's existence. Surrey, supra
note 3, at 233.
56. PRC JV Regs., supra note 33, art. 36.
57. Id. art. 38.
58. Id. art. 40.
59. Id. art. 42.
1989]
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3. Technology Transfer Requirements
Terms and conditions relating to the transfer of technology to the
joint venture are critical because the acquisition of foreign technology
was one of the major forces spurring the Chinese to open their borders
and markets to the outside world.6 0 The following are the technology
transfer requirements for joint ventures. First, the technology transfer
agreement must be approved by MOFERT. Second, the expenses for
the technology's use must be fair and reasonable and "not higher than
the standard international rate."'" Third, the term for a technology
transfer agreement generally may not exceed ten years. Fourth, at the
technology transfer agreement's expiration, the technology importing
party shall have the right to use the technology forever. Fifth, the ex-
change of information on the technology's improvement shall be recip-
rocal. Sixth, the technology importing party can buy its raw material
and equipment from any source it sees fit. Lastly, there may be "no
irrational restrictive clauses prohibited by Chinese law .... ,,""
These technology transfer requirements have caused some appre-
hension amongst foreign investors, particularly United States investors
who are used to "tight licensing arrangements."6 3 Some advanced tech-
nology licensors categorically require licensees to purchase from ap-
proved suppliers, to submit to rigorous quality maintenance checks, ge-
ographical market restrictions, and "prohibitions on any tinkering with
the technology."" Chinese inflexibility in this area has led to some ces-
sation of negotiations in the past" and there is no reason to believe
that it will change in the near future.6
The fruit of the joint venture is its product and the sale of this
product is vital to the enterprise's financial success. 7 The "Chinese
Government encourages joint ventures to sell their products on the in-
ternational market."6 Joint ventures may sell products that "China
60. Surrey, supra note 3, at 233.
61. Id. at 234.
62. PRC JV Regs., supra note 33, art. 46.
63. Surrey, supra note 3, at 235. For example, the ten-year limitation on licensing
agreements has caused some trepidation, as has the provision dealing with the Chinese
party's right to use the technology forever at the end of the licensing period. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 239. In the area of technology transfers, there is still not enough experience
on the implementation of the Regulations. Id. at 235. The first technology licenses to
reach the end of the ten-year maximum term will not expire until 1993; thus, some West-
ern companies may be waiting to see how the Regulations and MOFERT's implementa-
tion/interpretation of the Regulations will affect foreign entities. Id. at 239.
67. Id. at 240.
68. PRC JV Regs., supra note 33, art. 60.
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urgently needs or imports .. .on the Chinese market.""9
4. Tax Implications
Joint ventures are taxed in accordance with Chinese law.7 0 Addi-
tionally, the joint venture's staff members and workers must pay "indi-
vidual income tax according to the Individual Income Tax Law of the
People's Republic of China."'" Machinery, parts, equipment and other
materials used for the production of export goods are exempt from tax-
ation and customs duties. 2 Additionally, export goods that are ap-
proved by the Ministry of Finance are exempt from taxation.7 ' The
joint venture can also apply for a tax reduction or exemption "for a
certain period of time for products that are sold on the domestic mar-




All joint venture labor matters will be handled in compliance with
the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Labour Manage-
ment in Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment ("La-
bor Relations").
75
69. Id. art. 61.
70. Id. art. 69.
71. Id. art. 70.
72. Id. art. 71.
73. Id. art. 72. China, in its desire to modernize and create a more favorable balance
of trade, must create incentives for investors to come to China. One such incentive for
the foreign investor is the chance of selling its product to an untapped market of about
1.2 billion consumers. The Chinese, although interested in putting higher quality con-
sumer goods on the domestic market, are also interested in recruiting foreign talent that
will produce goods to sell on the international market. The PRC hopes that the creation
of a favorable tax environment, in addition to the promise of a large group of new con-
sumers, will lure foreign investors to China. This is the primary rationale for the exemp-
tion of certain export goods from taxation. See generally Note, People's Republic of
China - 1983 Joint Venture Implementing Regulations - The Supplement of Detail, in
an Attempt to Attract Foreign Investment, 15 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 389 (1985).
74. PRC JV Regs., supra note 33, art. 72.
75. Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Labour Management in Joint
Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment [hereinafter PRC Labor Regs.], trans-
lated in 1 LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 44 (1982). Not all
of the regulations concerning labor can be found in the Labor Regulations; some of the
regulations are contained in the Joint Venture Regulations. Article 94 of the Joint Ven-
ture Regulations states that the salaries of the joint venture's high ranking officials will
be set by the Board of Directors. PRC JV Regs., supra note 33, art. 94. Article 95 gives
the workers the right to set up a trade union. Id. art. 95. Article 98 gives the trade union
representatives the right to attend board meetings as non-voting members to report
19891
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Article 2 of the Labor Regulations requires that there be a labor con-
tract between the joint venture and the workers' trade union, covering
such matters as dismissal, wages, and vacation time." Article 8 of the
Labor Regulations provides that workers and staff members in a joint
venture shall be paid "120 to 150% of the real wages of the workers
and staff members of state-owned enterprises of the same trade in the
same locality."" The reason for this is that the PRC feels that the
joint venture will not provide the housing, medical and educational
benefits that the state enterprises furnishs.7 In a remarkable divergence
from Marxist-Leninist philosophy, Article 4 of the Labor Regulations




6. The Duration of the Joint Venture
The parties to the joint venture have the right to decide the dura-
tion of the association, although the average length is from ten to
thirty years.8" This article is indicative of the Chinese view that the
joint venture is not meant to last indefinitely; rather, it is intended to
last long enough to allow the Chinese to gain some expertise so that
they can in turn run the operation by themselves (and not have to
share the management or profits with any foreigners).'" The following
is a list of the ways in which the joint venture may be terminated, such
as: (1) the term's expiration; (2) inability to continue the operation due
to heavy losses or force majeure (e.g., war); (3) breach of contractual
arrangement; and (4) the occurrence of some agreed upon event that
would call for dissolution. s2 With the exception of the expiration of the
worker opinions. Id. art. 98. Article 98 also instructs the Board of Directors to "heed the
opinions of the trade unions and win its co-operation [sic]." Id.
76. PRC Labor Regs., supra note 75, art. 2.
77. Id. art. 8.
78. Surrey, supra note 3, at 246.
79. PRC Labor Regs., supra note 75, art. 4.
80. PRC JV Regs., supra note 33, art. 100. Article 100 was amended in 1986, how-
ever, to allow for certain joint ventures to be extended to 50 years, if the venture: (1) is a
large investment that has a long construction period and a low profit, or (2) has ad-
vanced or high technology for the manufacture of sophisticated equipment that is pro-
vided by the foreign venturer, or (3) the products are internationally competitive. Hors-
ley, Promoting Foreign Investment: Notes on Recent Developments, EAST ASIAN
EXECUTIVE REPORTS, Mar. 1986, at 9. Although this amendment seems to indicate that
the Chinese are gaining confidence in their dealings with foreigners, terms such as "ad-
vanced technology," still have not been dispositively defined by Chinese officials. Id.
81. Surrey, supra note 3, at 247. Foreigners tend to hope that the government will
allow the association to extend for an "additional term." Id.
82. PRC JV Regs., supra note 33, art. 102.
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joint venture's term, the approval authority must consent to the cessa-
tion of the venture."8
7. Disputes Between the Parties
In accordance with traditional Chinese legal thought, Article 109
directs that disputes between the parties "shall, if possible, be settled
through friendly consultation or mediation.""s If the parties cannot
settle their disputes in this manner, they should either arbitrate their
grievances 5 or, if the parties have not stipulated for arbitration in a
written agreement, take their case to the Chinese People's Court. 6
While the Joint Venture Implementation Regulations cleared up
many of the ambiguities remaining from the Joint Venture Law, there
are still areas that could cause problems for the foreign investor.8 "
IV. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF JOINT VENTURES IN THE
PRC
Management of the joint venture is one of the first problem areas
the foreign investor will encounter.88 Control of the joint venture be-
gins with the Board of Directors. 9 Unlike the Board of Directors of a
normal corporation, however, a joint venture's Board is composed of
two groups, each allied with the participant and country they re-
present.90 Because of the Board's composition, it would be wise "not to
overload the joint venture with too many unanimity requirements be-
cause this could lead to paralysis of the day-to-day operations of the
enterprise." '9 1
The advantages of the management structure in China, however,
outweigh the disadvantages. Unlike other Communist nations, the
83. Id.
84. Id. art. 109.
85. Id. art. 110. Arbitration may be conducted in China before the Foreign Economic
and Trade Arbitration Commission of the China Council for the Promotion of Interna-
tional Trade or through an arbitration agency in a third country. Id.
86. Id. art. 111. This course of action, however, runs contrary to established Chinese
practices and will, in all probability, never be used in a business context. The Chinese
feel that virtually all problems can be worked out through conciliation and mediation,
ensuring that no party loses "face" and thereby preserving the business relationship. See
generally Jaslow, supra note 17 (discussing a comparison of the Chinese view of dispute
resolution with that of various Eastern European nations).
87. Surrey, supra note 3, at 248.
88. Jaslow, supra note 17, at 217.
89. PRC JV Regs., supra note 33, art. 33.
90. Jaslow, supra note 17, at 217.
91. Id. at 219 (citing Lorinczi & Dorian, U.S.-Hungarian Joint Ventures: Prospects
and Problems, 10 L. & POL. INT. Bus. 1205, 1216 (1973)).
1989]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
PRC allows the Western investor to own more than 49% of the joint
venture. 2 Additionally, even if the Chinese participant has contributed
a majority of the investment, the foreign investor can gain equality of
voting power if it is written into the contract that each side will have
an equal number of members on the Board."3
Another significant advantage for the foreign investor is that the
general manager, responsible for the day-to-day running of the opera-
tion, does not have to be Chinese.9 4 This allows the foreign party to
exercise significant "de facto control," especially since it is the foreign
participant who possesses the superior technical and managerial ability
and experience25 This control is a "buffer against the local partner's"
advantage of having the operation in its country. 6
There are several problems the foreign investor may encounter
when entering into a joint venture in the PRC. One area that is fre-
quently problematic for joint ventures in developing countries is the
utilization of local labor. 7 Most of the difficulty arises from the fact
that the laborer is usually unskilled in the joint venture's work, which
is often a high technology area.98 In addition to his lack of training, the
Chinese worker is "the product of a system which, until very recently,
put little or no premium on productivity or self-motivation."9 9 Conse-
quently, many joint venturers have found their staffs to be unwilling to
change and below par in terms of training and motivation."°0 This is
not always the case but, even in those situations where it is true ini-
tially, circumstances will generally improve after the Chinese are ex-
posed to the new working methods of their foreign co-venturer and
have time to familiarize themselves with their required tasks., ° 1 Many
foreign venturers describe their Chinese workers as "hardworking and
creative" and often praise them for "their precision handwork in spe-
92. Jaslow, supra note 17, at 223-24. For example, in Yugoslavia, the Western partici-
pant is limited to 49% of the investment. Id. It is still possible, however, for a party
holding 49% of a corporation's stock to have voting control, as long as there are at least
three shareholders and neither has more than 50% of the shares. Id. at 218 n.51.
93. Id. at 218 n.52.
94. PRC JV Regs., supra note 33, art. 40.
95. Jaslow, supra note 17, at 220-21.
96. Id. at 222.
97. Surrey, supra note 3, at 249.
98. Id. This lack of technical expertise can hardly be blamed on the individual Chi-
nese worker. Until recently, Chinese industry had not properly functioned or developed
in the post-World War II era; accordingly, the skills of Chinese workers and managers
had not been adequately nurtured. See Rogers, supra note 24, at 18.
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cialized manufacturing processes. 1 0 2 Because worker competence and
ability is sometimes a problem, another area that demands the foreign
participant's full attention is quality control.10 3 Consumer goods are
usually in great demand in state-planned economies, which are notori-
ous for their lack of emphasis on quality control."0 4 This will force the
foreign joint venturer to apply greater scrutiny than is normally re-
quired to ensure that the goods produced "will be acceptable in the
international marketplace.' 0 In order to provide this greater level of
scrutiny, the joint venture will have to employ additional quality con-
trol managers (usually foreign) and spend extra time on inspections." 6
A final major problem area for investors is gaining access to the
Chinese consumer; in fact, the prospect of being able to tap that rela-
tively uncharted market is one of the chief reasons foreigners want to
start joint ventures in the PRC. 0 7 There is often a clashing of
goals-the Chinese are eager to make products to sell in the interna-
tional arena to create a favorable foreign exchange balance, whereas
the foreign party is frequently searching for a new market for its
goods.'08 This impasse is partially rectified in Article 61 of the Joint
Venture Implementing Regulations, which allows for products manu-
factured by the joint venture to be sold on the Chinese market.0 9 The
article goes no further than saying, however, that the only goods al-
lowed to be sold on the domestic market are those that "China ur-
gently needs or imports."1 0 This rather nebulous guidance is often of
little comfort to the prospective joint venturer, but, at the very least, it
does open the door for negotiations. 1
102. Stavis & Gang, A Survey of Shanghai Joint Ventures, 15 CHINA Bus. Rav. 46, 47
(1988); see also Surrey, supra note 3, at 249.




107. Id. at 226. The Chinese consumer has shown a great affinity for purchasing
Western or modern goods. Although the salary of a Chinese worker is low compared to
that of a worker in a more highly industrialized country, the number of potential cus-
tomers is extremely attractive to the Western investor searching for new markets and
new customers. Id.
108. Id. at 240. See generally Note, supra note 73.
109. PRC JV Regs., supra note 33, art. 61.
110. Id.
111. See generally Note, supra note 73 (discussing a series of Department of Com-
merce telegrams sent right after the adoption of the Joint Venture Regulations which
support the assertion that foreigners covet access to the Chinese market and hope to
gain greater access through negotiation).
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V. JOINT VENTURES IN JAPAN
In The Book of Five Rings Miyamoto Musashi, known to the Japa-
nese as Kensei, or "Sword Saint,"1 2 wrote, "The principle of strategy
is having one thing, to know ten thousand things."'1 3 When a foreign
party enters into a joint venture with a Japanese company, the foreign
party is committing itself to more than one dealing; rather, it is enter-
ing into a complex, multi-faceted marriage-like relationship." 4 In fact,
the Japanese partner considers the joint venture to be a kogaisha, or
"child company," ascribing to itself and the foreign party the respec-
tive roles of in-laws who "should take joy and pride in the offspring."' 5
Before examining the way to create a joint venture, it is first nec-
essary to generally understand the Japanese concept of law. Japan, un-
like the United States, is a code country."' Since most of the law in
Japan is promulgated in the form of statutory rules, "many business-
men consider themselves experts on corporate law and do not use law-
yers in joint venture negotiations.""' 7 The Japanese would rather "rely
on... effective human rapport... [than] legal documentation. '"" s The
Japanese prefer compromise to litigation and try to use their courts to
112. M. MUSASHI, THE BOOK OF FivE RINGS 18 (V. Harris trans. 17th ed. 1974) (The
cited language is a description of Musashi, written by Harris in a preliminary section,
before the translated text began.).
113. Id. at 44. The Book of Five Rings is one of the classic martial arts texts. Written
in 1645 in a cave, where Musashi spent the last two years of his life, The Book of Five
Rings is the definitive text on Kendo, or the Way of the Sword. During his lifetime,
Musashi, a ronin (masterless samurai), fought more than 60 duels, never losing one. Id.
at 15. He is widely regarded by the Japanese as the greatest samurai in their history. The
book is unique, in that it "deals with both the strategy of warfare and the methods of
single combat in exactly the same way." Id. at 18. The book, however, is not a "thesis on
strategy," but rather a "guide for men who want to learn strategy." Id. The Book of Five
Rings is required reading for Japanese business executives, bureaucrats and martial art-
ists, and is universal in its application. Id. at 22.
114. Ballon, supra note 6, at 135. In Japan, marriage is more the joining of two fami-
lies rather than two individuals. This practice is still kept alive today (although not as
prevalent as in the past) by "go-betweens," who are more concerned with the compatibil-
ity of the two families than the two individuals. Id. This is also true in business. While
the Western partner usually looks at itself as the bridesmaid and is concerned only with
its partner, the Japanese partner looks at the venture as a child who is getting married,
ascribing the role of in-law to itself. Id. Thus, it appears that the Japanese partner looks
at the venture in a broader fashion than does the Western partner. Id.
115. Id.
116. King, supra note 6, at 113.
117. Id. Even though the Japanese partner may feel comfortable without an attorney
in negotiations in Japan, it is standard for an American partner in a joint venture to
"check his proposed agreements with a Japanese corporate lawyer." Id.
118. Ballon, supra note 6, at 142.
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facilitate this end. 19
A. Japanese Companies
Traditionally, the joint venture has been the "primary vehicle for
major foreign investments in Japan.' 2 0 Before a foreign firm can set
up a joint venture with a Japanese firm, it must first understand the
Japanese system of companies.12' There are five different types of com-
panies in Japan: (1) Kabushiki Kaisha ("KK"), a limited liability com-
pany that is the predominant form used by Japanese companies in-
volved in international or large-scale business; (2) Yugen Kaisha
("YK"), a smaller limited liability company; (3) Goshi Kaisha, a com-
pany with unlimited and limited liability shareholders; (4) Gomei Kai-
sha, a company in which all shareholders have unlimited liability; and
(5) Sogo Kaisha, a company that can only be incorporated for insur-
ance business. 22 Of the various types of companies, KK and YK are
the forms most suited for joint ventures.2 3 KK is the form most fre-
quently employed, however, for reasons relating to "public image. "124
Thus, when a joint venture with a Japanese company is mentioned in
this Note, the reference is to a KK.
B. Investment Goals
Before entering into a joint venture, the foreign party needs to de-
cide what its goals are and then find a suitable Japanese partner. Fac-
tors to be considered are the reputation of the Japanese company (an
especially critical element in Japan), its business philosophy, and its
future plans.'2" One point that many Western investors fail to take into
account is that the Japanese generally seek long-term investments,
119. Id. at 142-43. In fact, the United States has approximately 150 lawyers for every
100,000 people, whereas Japan has only eight. Id. at 142. Litigation is perceived as being
inherently combative and, as such, goes against the natural Japanese tendency to avoid
open conflict. Id. Additionally, litigation usually results in one side winning and the
other losing; this too is seen as not being satisfactory, since the Japanese believe that all
interests are capable of being satisfied to a certain degree in any dispute. Id.
120. Shapiro, supra note 12, at 47.
121. Asahina, supra note 1, at 20.
122. Id.
123. McArthur, supra note 2, at 477.
124. Id. A KK is almost always a large company, with a loyal work force. It is per-
ceived by the Japanese business community as the premier form for doing business on a
large scale; thus, a Western partner who enters into a joint venture with a different type
of company would not be thought of as a company that understands the Japanese econ-
omy or marketplace. Asahina, supra note 1, at 20.
125. E. HAHN, supra note 3, at 63.
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usually lasting ten to twenty years. 26 This is manifested in the way the
partners view profits. Typically, the Japanese party wants long-term
profits, and will expend significant time and energy in refining existing
products and developing new ones.127 These actions are imperative for
the Japanese company's survival in the highly competitive business en-
vironment in Japan, where great emphasis is placed on continued long-
term growth and solidified market share.'2 8 The foreign party, on the
other hand, usually enters the joint venture with the idea of developing
products that will ensure a large short-term profit. 29 To increase the
chances of the joint venture's success, it is imperative that the parties
have consonant goals. 130
C. Joint Venture Agreements
The 50/50 joint venture (a form where both parties are considered
equal partners for purposes of profit-sharing and responsibility) is the
form preferred by the Japanese government. 3 ' Control over the part-
nership is exercised "through the joint venture and related agree-
ments.' 32 Joint venture agreements are governed by the Japanese
Civil Code. 3 ' The Joint Venture Agreement usually outlines and de-
fines the
rights and obligations of the parties with respect to a number
of basic matters: the parties' contributions; finance for the joint
venture's operations; the parties' shareholdings; the number of
directors each party can appoint; methods of termination and
liquidation; as well as the parties' agreement on important op-
erational matters.
34
Other areas in which agreements are needed are "technical assistance
given to the joint venture, licensing of patents, transfer of personnel to
126. Tung, Keys to Success in Joint Ventures in Japan, EAST ASIAN EXECUTIVE RE-
PORTS, Nov. 1984, at 12.




131. Ballon, supra note 6, at 138.
132. McArthur, supra note 2, at 479.
133. See generally MINPO (Civil Code). The Civil Code is one of the five basic codes
of Japan, the others being the Civil Procedure, Penal, Criminal Procedure and Commer-
cial Codes. Form of Citation of Japanese Legal Materials, 42 WASH. L. REV. 589, 597
(1967).
134. McArthur, supra note 2, at 479-80.
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the joint venture, and management and distribution of the
products." '
The Japan Fair Trade Commission ("JFTC") reviews all interna-
tional trade agreements in accordance with guidelines they devised
and, if it finds anything in the agreement it feels is an unfair business
practice, it "will suggest that the agreement be amended." '
D. Board of Directors
Another necessary step in the formation of the joint venture is the
composition of the Board of Directors. The Joint Venture Agreement
and the Articles of Incorporation delineate the Board's make-up and
degree of authority over the joint venture.137 This is a potential prob-
lem area, for even if the Japanese party agrees to foreign control of the
venture, the government will object if the degree of foreign control is
greater than the proportion of its stock ownership. 38
Article 255 of the Commercial Code requires that the board have
at least three members, 39 although the normal number is six or
seven. 4 0 Although there is no requirement, the joint venture's presi-
dent is usually the president of the Japanese parent company (at least




Another problem area for the foreign participant is labor recruit-
ment. The Japanese lifetime employment system, with its extensive
fringe benefits, makes it extremely difficult for the foreign investor to
recruit quality managers, engineers, and workers. 4 3 Japan's best work-
ers are usually unwilling to labor for foreigners or for a company that
135. Id. at 480.
136. Beem & Impert, Establishing a Joint Venture, EAST ASIAN EXECUTIVE REPORTS,
Jan. 1986, at 17, 21 (citing Anti-Monopoly Act Guidelines for International Licensing
Agreements issued by the Fair Trade Commission on May 24, 1968).
137. Ballon, supra note 6, at 146.
138. Id.
139. SHOHO (Commercial Code) art. 255.
140. Ballon, supra note 6, at 146.
141. Id. There is virtually no difference between an American and a Japanese Board
of Directors. One of the few differences is that in a KK the declaration of dividends is
"subject to the approval of a general meeting of shareholders." Asahina, Establishing A
Presence: A Comparative Analysis Of Entry Vehicles-II, EAST ASIAN EXECUTIVE RE-
PORTS, Oct. 1985, at 9, 16.
142. Ballon, supra note 6, at 146-47.
143. McArthur, supra note 2, at 474.
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has not proven itself capable of providing them with the lifetime secur-
ity of the large Japanese companies. 144 This problem can be exacer-
bated, however, with the aid of the Japanese partner, who can "sec-
ond" (or transfer) his own workers to the joint venture, thus giving the
Western partner access to skilled and motivated workers. 5
Transferring workers in this manner is not without its draw-
backs.146 First, the Japanese workers will remain loyal to the Japanese
partner, because they are eventually going to return to the parent com-
pany. 71 4 Second, when the workers do go back to the Japanese parent,
they will bring all of the knowledge and know-how they learned while
working on the joint venture with them.4 8 Finally, seconded employees
"increase the Japanese partner's de facto control over the business."",
F. The Revised Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law
The most significant statutory restriction foreign investors face in
Japan is the Revised Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law
("FECL"), passed in 1979."50 The FECL is of great importance to par-
ties contemplating a joint venture, as it controls fundamental issues
such as the acquisition of shares in the joint venture' 5' and the transfer
of technology and industrial property rights.15 2 The new, less stringent
FECL was not passed to attract foreign investment; rather, it was
promulgated in response to severe pressure from foreign nations, espe-
cially the United States. 3 Nevertheless, the FECL requirements are
still strict. Two of the more important provisions for the foreign inves-
tor to be concerned with are Article 26, regulating direct domestic in-
144. Id.
145. Id.




150. Revised Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, Law No. 228, 1949,
translated in EIBUN-HORAI-SHA (CODES, TRANSLATIONS INSTITUTE) LAW BULLETIN, No.
5010, AA 2 (1985).
151. Id. art. 26.
152. Id. art. 29.
153. McArthur, supra note 2, at 485. The United States was among the most vocal of
the nations protesting against the almost insurmountable barriers the Japanese had er-
ected to keep foreign products out of Japan. The United States not only protested to
Japan directly, but also at the meetings of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"), a group of nations formed immediately prior to the end of World War 11.
GATT's purpose was to ensure that the postwar economic recovery was as swift and
painless for the world community as possible. Id.
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vestment,' and Article 29 regulating technology importation/transfer
agreements.' 55
1. Direct Domestic Investment
Examples of direct domestic investment under the FECL are: (1)
acquisition of stock or shares of a company; (2) establishing a branch
in Japan; and (3) lending money to a juridical person having its main
office in Japan. 56 Article 26 of the FECL further provides that the
foreign investor must notify the Ministry of Finance of direct domestic
investment, and he or she cannot act on that investment until the stat-
utory waiting period has expired. 157 Additionally, the Minister of Fi-
nance and the Minister of the industry involved have the power, under
Article 27, to change, postpone or cancel the transaction if they deter-
mine that: (1) it might imperil Japan's national security or adversely
affect public safety; (2) it might adversely and seriously affect Japanese
businesses engaged in the same types of business; and (3) it might dis-
rupt the smooth running of the Japanese economy.'5 8
2. Technology Transfer Agreements
Article 29 requires that both parties to the joint venture must file
reports with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of the industry
involved in the joint venture, when there is an agreement involving the
transfer of technology or industrial property rights, or when technical
assistance is to be rendered to the foreign co-venturer. 19 There is a
statutory waiting period of thirty days that must expire before the li-
cense between the parties becomes effective. 6 0
G. Termination of Joint Venturers
The average life of a Japanese joint venture is normally between
six to eight years.' Most joint ventures have no set termination date
and have the "usual provisions for termination on insolvency or
breach.'162 A recommended termination clause is one that provides an
option for termination in the case of "irreconcilable differences" be-
154. FECL, supra note 150, art. 26.
155. Id. art. 29.
156. FECL, supra note 150, art. 26(2).
157. Id. art. 26(4). The normal waiting time is 30 days.
158. Id. art. 27.
159. Id. art. 29.
160. Id.
161. Shapiro, supra note 12, at 53.
162. Id. at 54.
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tween the parties to the venture.' Two of the more common reasons
for termination are: (1) the foreign party has learned how to operate in
the Japanese market and no longer needs the Japanese party or wants
to split profits; and (2) the Japanese party finds that the foreign part-
ner can offer it nothing further and has thus outlived its usefulness. 64
The success rate of joint ventures in Japan is not very high."6 5 Fre-
quently this is due to a failure by the foreign (usually Western) party
to adapt itself to "Japanese business practices, negotiating styles, and
social customs."' 66
VI. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF JOINT VENTURES IN JAPAN
One of the major advantages of joint ventures in Japan is access to the
"greatly maligned Japanese distribution system ... [that] often inhib-
its foreign companies from selling their products competitively.' 6 7 A
foreign company that tries to market its products the way it does in its
native land will often find that the Japanese consumer will not re-
spond. " A "Japanese partner's contacts and experience in, and under-
standing of, the distribution system ensure that the joint venture's
products reach the consumer in the same manner as those of the Japa-
nese competition, thereby increasing the products' chances of suc-
cess.""6 The Japanese partner's "goodwill . . . and knowledge of the
market" are vital to the venture's success. °
Without the aid of a Japanese partner, the foreign joint venturer
may have great difficulty securing financing from local institutions.
71
The Japanese party's "relationship with its bank and its credit stand-
ing can facilitate sufficient debt financing for the business.',
7 2
163. Id.
164. McArthur, supra note 2, at 483.
165. Id. at 489. A 1981 MITI survey reported that "one out of every seven foreign
companies 'retrench and eventually pull out of Japan.'" Tung, supra note 126, at 9
(quoting JAPAN EXTERNAL TRADE ORGANIZATION, FOREIGN COMPANIES IN JAPAN 8 (1982)).
166. Tung, supra note 126, at 9. Ralston Purina Company, the pet food manufac-
turer, has had a joint venture operating in Japan for 22 years and has found that, in
addition to choosing the right partner and working together, three factors have been
fundamental to their success: (1) strong continuity in management; (2) detailed discus-
sions at all times on major strategic issues; and (3) senior management participation by
both sides of the joint venture. Hatfield, Reaching the Japanese Market: The Joint
Venture Solution, EAST ASIAN EXECunvE REPORTS, Oct. 1986, at 17.




171. Id. at 474.
172. Id.
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Additionally, the Japanese partner undoubtedly has contacts in
the government and administrative agencies whose consent is essential
for conducting business.173 As in the case of financing, a foreign com-
pany with no record in Japan may not be able to secure the necessary
governmental licenses without the aid of a domestic partner.1 74
Finally, a Japanese partner gives the foreign party "access to good
Japanese management personnel and to a skilled labor force,"'"5 who
probably would not work for the foreign party otherwise.
176
A major disadvantage of undertaking a Japanese joint venture is
that "[m]anagement control must be shared, and in most cases nega-
tive control (i.e., a mutual veto) is the most that can be obtained re-
gardless of how formal share ownership is divided....
Another disadvantage is that usually there are fundamental philo-
sophical differences between the parties with respect to business strat-
egy and marketing strategy.'78 It is imperative when deciding which
Japanese partner to ally with that the foreign investor fully understand
the Japanese partner's goals and methods.
179
The final major disadvantage of joint ventures with Japanese com-
panies is that the foreign party is providing technology to a potential
competitor.18 ° Promises made by the Japanese party not to use the
technology or know-how "outside the parameters of the joint venture"
are generally ineffective in preventing that partner from using the in-
formation after the venture has been terminated, since "[v]iolations
are difficult to police, prove and prohibit."'181 The best protection
method is to "license the joint venture itself, not the other partner,
and impose strict restrictions on the disclosure of confidential informa-
tion." '182 This can only be achieved if there is physical partitioning of
the Japanese party's seconded employees from the persons who are re-
ceiving the actual technology."8 3 Often, however, this is impossible, be-




175. Shapiro, supra note 12, at 47.
176. See infra notes 188-90.
177. Shapiro, supra note 12, at 48.
178. Id.
179. McArthur, supra note 2, at 474-75.
180. Shapiro, supra note 12, at 48-49.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Joint ventures are a means by which both parties can make use of
each other's strengths while minimizing their potential losses by shar-
ing capital and risks.' Because the venture's success or failure hinges
on the joint management of the operation, both sides must enter into
the agreement in a spirit of cooperation and attempt to sublimate their
parochial interests in favor of the common goal.186 Differences in opin-
ion can make the operation and management of the joint venture diffi-
cult, if not impossible. 87
The PRC has proven that it is excited about foreign investment.'88
At the present time, China is only starting to be regarded as a country
in which a foreign party can "achieve a respectable rate of return" on
its investment.' In fact, given China's post-World War II system of
government, it is remarkable that the PRC is considered by foreign
investors at all.' 90 This reversal is a "great tribute to China's current
leadership. "191
Western countries have noted that, since the 1983 negotiations,
plant constructions and the general business climate have improved in
terms of speed and amicability. 92 Additionally, although there are
''many stories about bureaucratic nightmares," many foreign managers
find the PRC bureaucracies "generally tolerable."' 93
The result is that the PRC is an environment that welcomes for-
eign investment, albeit not without certain restrictions. 94 The Joint
Venture Law and the Joint Venture Implementing Regulations are
concerted efforts by the PRC to attract foreign investors to China, in
order to aid China in achieving its goal of economic modernization by
the turn of the century.'
Japan, on the other hand, has had over 100 years experience with
foreign joint ventures. 96 One of the major differences between joint
ventures in Japan and the PRC is that the Japanese are not very will-
ing to adapt their business practices and philosophy to those of the
185. E. HAHN, supra note 3, at 63.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Surrey, supra note 3, at 222.
189. Id. at 257.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Stavis & Gang, supra note 102, at 47.
193. See id. at 48.
194. See generally Surrey, supra note 3, at 232-33.
195. Id.
196. Ballon, supra note 6, at 134.
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West. 197 European executives have long complained about joint ven-
tures in Japan. 9 8 Three main problems in dealing with the Japanese
are: (1) the Japanese parent company always desires an increase of the
joint venture's market share, "almost regardless of company profitabil-
ity;" (2) the Japanese work philosophy and employment practice; and
(3) the complete divergence of the Japanese "salary structure with its
unique fringe benefits and expense accounts" from the European/
Western model.'99
Additionally, Japan's statutory scheme is not designed to attract
foreign investment, but rather to subtly discourage it.2" The bureau-
cratic maze in Japan is a formidable one, almost incapable of success-
ful negotiation without domestic aid.2 1'
This is not to say that a joint venture in Japan is doomed from its
inception, however, the foreign investor should embark on this course
fully aware of the relatively low survival rate of such operations.210 To
achieve success in a Japanese joint venture, a foreign party will have to
adjust itself to Japanese business practices, be willing to meet the Jap-
anese halfway, find a Japanese partner whose goals and objectives are
compatible, gain the personal trust of the Japanese partner, and be
able to offer the Japanese partner a unique product or service.2 03
Both Japan and the PRC have attractive and unattractive features
in the way they have structured their respective joint venture laws.
Compromise and accommodation are necessary for success in business
relations with both nations. For the investor willing to attempt to sur-
mount these obstacles, the potential rewards are limitless.
Richard E. Pelosi, Jr.
197. Id; see also Surrey, supra note 3, at 224.
198. Ballon, supra note 6, at 134.
199. Id.
200. See generally McArthur, supra note 2, at 471; King, supra note 6, at 135.
201. McArthur, supra note 2, at 474.
202. See generally J. ABEGGLEN & G. STALK, KAISHA, THE JAPANESE CORPORATION
(1985).
203. Tung, supra note 126, at 12.
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